Discussion about this post

User's avatar
Roman's avatar

Great article, I haven't seen much Christian engagement with the apparent horror of the human condition assuming embryonic personhood - you present some compelling ways one can grapple with it. What about the science makes a strong positive case to you that conception is the appropriate initial moment of humanity/personhood/ensoulment? Do you think that if medeivals were shown everything we currently understand about fetuses and embryos that they would agree? I am inclined to use conception as the line because it's the only line I am 100% certain prevents all murders, but find it generally likely that the true line is sometime between conception and birth, and that the embryo-person relation is analagous to the seed-tree relation.

Footnote 4 was striking in highlighting your relative confidence in embryonic personhood vs Christianity, probably the most surprising statement in the essay to me.

River Allen's avatar

I appreciate this thoughtful article and the hopeful vision you imagine. As someone who shares a hope in God's salvation but doesn't share your views on abortion, I hadn't encountered or engaged with the miscarriage argument before, and I appreciate your response to it. Below is my attempt to engage in good faith with your theodicy as it relates to questions of abortion. I can only hope that good faith comes across.

You say: “For the pro-lifer who believes in God, the pro-choice argument from fetal death rate does reveal a problem. It’s just not a problem with the pro-life position.”

Perhaps that’s so, but it seems to me that your massa innocens “story” in fact does present a potential problem for abortion—or at least raises more questions than it answers.

If we assume unbaptized, unborn children die to a contemplative life that is “simply superior” to the active life before they are aware of that active life alternative, that must be a good thing for that child. As you say for those whose deaths are unintentional: “Perhaps half the human race is jumping for a chance to return to their true home country.” 

Indeed, per Paul, we all in some sense ought to be desiring to return to the home country—yet we remain (and refuse to kill ourselves) according to a sense of duty and sacrifice, for “to live is Christ; to die is gain.” But as you note, an unthinking, unborn child simply cannot know Christ as we do. So for that child, to die is gain, and there is no counterweight.

Further, under the salvation scheme you’ve postulated, whether the unborn child arrives at their true home country by act of God or act of man (or woman) makes no difference to that child. They are home with God.

So, if massa innocens is right, we must condemn abortion by some other metric than what is good or not good for the unborn child.

And you do that. Re: abortion, you conclude: “Of course, none of this would make abortion okay. Quite the contrary: if the relatively small number of humans sent into this suffering world were only sent here because each of them is somehow vital to the fate of humanity, then tearing some of those small humans limb from limb (or poisoning them, or suffocating them, or starving them) turns out to be not just barbaric, but self-destructive. We’re killing our own reinforcements!”

Setting aside the purported barbarism (which to me seems somewhat undermined by the theodicy but in any event doesn't bear on the theodicy / begs the broader ethical question(s) of abortion), you conclude that abortion is wrong because it deprives humanity—us—of our fellow active laborers.

I see two challenges with that:

First, you appear to acknowledge some doubts about that premise, both objective and subjective: objectively, you cast doubt on whether we who remain are somehow worse off without those children: "looked at from a wider perspective, abortion does not change the human reality all that much." You also note that, even from an emotional or psychological standpoint, the effects of such a death toll may be relatively constrained to a select few (including yourself) who in fact can feel those effects. While for you, it is "shocking to contemplate the magnitude of the crime we have inflicted upon ourselves," you acknowledge that "Most don’t. From observation, it seems to me that many can’t." Of course, I am not suggesting the subjective response alone is a basis to draw an affirmative ethical conclusion one way or the other. But it does give me pause. If the question is whether we (not the children) are worse off, and we (not the children) don't feel worse off, that collective subjective response (or lack thereof) bears some significance. Accepting those doubts, we might conclude that, if there is a wrong done to us who remain, it would need to be in something other than either objective human terms or our collective, subjective response. I suppose it would need to be in some theological terms—in God's accounting, not ours.

Second, even if the premise (that we who remain are worse off) is correct, perhaps along that unknowable theological metric, it still doesn’t seem to me to be conclusive as to whether abortion is evil in the scheme of this theodicy. For starters, we’d have to measure our societal deprivation against the individual improvement of the unborn child's station. More precisely, we'd have to measure it against the collective accumulation of such individual improvements, which, given the volume of abortions you cite, could be quite large. Simply put, if it is better for the child but worse for the living humans when a child dies in utero, each time a child is born, we would be performing a minor sacrifice—subjecting the child to an inferior active life instead of the contemplative life in the name of God’s plan for humanity writ large.

Again, that balance may be toward the good—God and humanity may need a certain amount of active laborers, despite the cost to them individually of performing that service. But I don’t know that we can simply conclude that a fortiori.

Instead, to draw that conclusion, we’d have to make at least several other assumptions—assumptions that I think are glossed over by your use of the word “vital” above: that God wills for those specific unborn children to live and labor (as opposed to the others that die in utero without abortion); that God deliberately subjugates His will for them to live to the will and agency of the humans who abort them; and that God’s will and ability to preserve humanity writ large is somehow hindered by that subjugation in a material way.

Again, those assumptions may be right (or, for our purposes, conceivable). But I can’t help but think that, by posing these questions, this particular theodicy doesn’t avoid the problems related to the question of abortion—it just flattens them.

Rather, it seems to me that we wind up in the same place, asking the same fundamental questions about the same fundamental issues—the issues you identify: "the human right to live and the fetus’s humanity." Even if “there is no logical connection between a population’s natural death rate and its right not to be killed intentionally," we still have to ask the same questions: How do we define murder? Is it better for a particular human to be alive than to die? Is that answer the same depending on whether that human has chosen God and become a saved Christian? Is it the same if that human never had the opportunity to choose God?

Ultimately, I suppose that means I don't see this miscarriage argument to be quite as vapid as you do. My takeaway from your article and this effort at responding is that our views on abortion are probably more directly linked to our theodicies than we are first inclined to think.

13 more comments...

No posts

Ready for more?