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Tarb's avatar

Well, this is admittedly from years ago, but you allude to this article in the newest article, so...

"The Taney Court (1836-1864): Best known for the foul Dred Scott decision, and deservedly so."

Honestly, I question it being deservedly so. The Taney Court lasted for 28 years. Is it really fair to say that one decision, even one like Dred Scott, should be the one thing most people can name about it? I cannot think of any other court that is so identified with one particular case in particular; even Marbury v. Madison doesn't seem to dominate the idea of the Marshall Court like Dred Scott does for the Taney Court.

Then again, I can't off the top of my head say much they did other than that. I can point to Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Strader v. Graham, but those are mostly notable because of their connection to Dred Scott (Prigg is remembered because it's accused of "setting up" Dred Scott, and Strader is remembered because critics of Dred Scott say they could've decided Dred Scott narrowly and with little controversy had they simply affirmed some dicta from Strader). All that comes to mind offhand that isn't notable because of Dred Scott is The Prize Cases (allowing Lincoln to blockade ports early in the Civil War before there was a formal declaration of war), and while The Prize Cases was very important at the time, the fact it was about those very specific circumstances means they matter little for cases going forward and so it's not that remembered.

Maybe the reason for Dred Scott gobbling up all the focus is therefore the fact they didn't do all that much notable other than it. All the important groundwork had already been laid by Harlan, and there was less important things to rule on. After all, the federal government was smaller so there were fewer laws to litigate over, and there was not yet any Fourteenth Amendment (which is the gift that keeps on giving when it comes to creating constitutional litigation).

“I think the Warren and Burger courts should be counted together, but some people have the strange idea that Chief Justice Burger or his Court were conservative, so I must count them separately, or those people will think I’m pulling a fast one.”

I don't think many say Burger or the court was conservative, but there are plenty who think it was more conservative than the Warren Court. Granted, it was also the court that gave us Roe v. Wade, which was probably more extreme than anything out of the Warren Court. Still, I remember reading an article where someone was arguing that the belief that the Burger Court was particularly liberal comes largely from Roe v. Wade, and that it gave a misleading impression of the Burger Court as a whole. (Burger himself did later turn against Roe)

Drea's avatar

Thanks for this valuable contribution to current conversations! The later graphs show us something valuable that I hadn't seen elsewhere. The number of laws and institutions affected by each overturned precedent would be a worthy investigation for some grad student who can dedicate the time.

I do wonder about how you characterize stare decisis. You refer to it as a doctrine of keeping bad decisions, as amounting to an admission that something is wrong, but you don't want to fix it. That's not the way I've seen the term applied elsewhere. Stare decisis, as far as I have seen, applies where a court (or the Court) might rule in a variety of ways, without believing that precedent is necessarily wrong, but the court keeps to prior precedent in order to be fair and maintain trust in the law.

For example, the bar for prosecution for incitement to violence is extremely high in the United States. This precedent originally protected the violence of the KKK, but when leftists later came before the Court for inflammatory speech, stare decisis saw to it they were treated the same.

A legal team might rely heavily on stare decisis arguments when they suspect the judges before them do not agree with a prior ruling and will not buy their other arguments, but I'm not aware that invocation of the principle necessarily indicates a belief that the prior decision was in error. Not unless a Court believes that any decision other than what they would make with no precedent is bad, at which point we're discussing sheer arrogance more than legal reasoning.

How we read these graphs depends on how we contextualize history. The Constitution was written by wealthy White men in order to support their own long-term interests, and the early court made sure it did so. The lack of overturned precedents in the early court isn't just a function of the country being young; the range of judicial philosophies appointed would also have consistency within the range of interests they were designed to defend.

By the mid-20th century, we finally had enough people who were not White men in the electorate to filter into the dispositions and hermeneutics of the Supreme Court, thus resulting in readings that favored the American populace in general, at least sometimes--which necessarily means overturning precedents of a Court that did not. With the Barrett Court, thanks to a partisan re-alignment that enables a Senate majority to reflect the interests of well-off White men even with a minority of votes, we have a Court poised to return power to the race, class, and gender of people whom the framers intended. Out with the old overturnings, in with the new!

I have no doubt that you read this history differently.

Incidentally, I finally migrated over to Substack once you updated your old blog after some time. I'll probably be commenting on older posts now and again.

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